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.JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (1953 as amended) and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2)(a), 
whereby the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from a final order 
for anything other than a First Degree or Capital Felony. Lucero was convicted 
of the crime of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-507 (1953 as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The State submits one issue in addition to those presented by Lucero. 
ISSUE: Is Lucero precluded from raising issues concerning the trial 
judge's supplemental instruction to the jury and the judge's ex-parte 
communication with the jury, because he failed to object to those actions at trial? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-507 (1953 as amended) states: 
Possession of deadly weapon with intent to assault. Every 
person having upon his person any dangerous weapon with intent 
to unlawfully assault another is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c) states: 
Instructions, No Party may assign as error any portion of the 
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the 
jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects 
and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid 
manifest injustice. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) states: 
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry 
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify 
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any 
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or 
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental 
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify 
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor 
may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a 
matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be 
received for these purposes. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m) states: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform 
the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request 
to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be brought 
before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both 
counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury 
that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in 
writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which 
case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the 
record. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State accepts Lucero's Statement of the Case and Facts and 
supplements it as follows: 
After the trial judge sent the supplemental instruction to the jury without 
consulting Lucero, his attorney or the prosecutor, the judge called them into the 
courtroom and put into the record the jury's question and the responding 
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supplemental instruction. Transcript 181-183. A discussion followed during 
which Lucero's attorney did not object to the supplemental instruction or to the 
fact that the judge had sent it to the jury without consulting the parties. 
Transcript 181-183. In discussing the wording of the supplemental instruction 
Lucero's attorney said "Okay. Well, that would be—that should be adequate. I 
don't know how-I can't propose a better wording, anyway." Transcript 182. 
Later the judge called the parties into the courtroom after learning that the 
jury had reached a verdict. He gave the parties an opportunity to place anything 
into the record before bringing the jury in. Lucero's attorney did not object to 
the supplemental instruction or to the fact that the judge had sent it to the jury 
without consulting the parties. Transcript 183. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lucero appeals his conviction arguing the trial judge committed error by 
giving the jury a faulty supplemental instruction and by communicating that 
instruction to the jury without consulting the parties. However, he failed to 
object or challenge those actions at trial, though given the opportunity to do so. 
An objection at trial would have allowed the judge to consider the reasons for 
the objection and further instruct the jury if necessary. Lucero should be 
precluded from raising these issues upon appeal. 
Lucero has attempted to use a juror's affidavit containing information 
about the jury's deliberative process to bolster his arguments. The affidavit 
should be ignored under Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) which prohibits delving 
into that process. Lucero's attempt to characterize the trial judge's supplemental 
instruction as extraneous prejudicial information under Rule 606(b) should be 
rejected. Such a characterization would allow trial litigants to shoe-horn 
inquiries into the inner workings of a jury by simply alleging the jury 
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instructions were defective in some manner. Also, Utah law already provides a 
framework for analyzing whether jury instructions are correct. 
Viewing the instructions as a whole and in the context of the case it is 
clear that the jury was properly informed as to the elements of the crime 
charged. Lucerofs focus on the second sentence of the two-sentence 
supplemental instruction is too narrow. 
Finally, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m) allows the trial judge the 
discretion, when asked a question by the jury during deliberations, to respond to 
the inquiry without bringing the jury into the courtroom and without consulting 
the parties beforehand. As long as the parties are allowed to lodge objections to 
the response no irregularity has occurred. If this Court concludes 17(m) 
prohibits communication with the jury without consulting the parties, the trial 
judge's error in this case should be considered harmless because the 
communication itself was, in the context of the case and the other jury 
instructions, an accurate reflection of the law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. LUCERO SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE 
TRIAL JUDGE'S SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY AND 
EX-PARTE COMMUNICATION WITH THE JURY BECAUSE HE 
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THOSE ACTIONS AT TRIAL, 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c) mandates that a party may not 
assign as error the giving of a jury instruction unless he lodges an objection at 
trial. 
In this case Lucero has appealed his conviction arguing that a 
supplemental instruction given by the trial judge to the jury improperly allowed 
them to ignore an element of the crime. He also argues that the judge's 
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communication of this instruction to the jury without consulting the parties was 
prejudicial error. 
At trial, though, Lucero did not object to either action. Instead when the 
judge called the parties into the courtroom and informed them of submitting the 
supplemental instruction to the jury, Lucero1 s counsel stated that it was adequate 
and that he couldnft propose a better wording anyway. Lucerofs counsel made 
no mention of the judge's ex-parte communication. Transcript 181-183. At that 
point in the trial, if Lucero felt any error had occurred, it would have been 
possible to address his concerns by further instructing the jurors who were still 
deliberating. 
This case is very similar to State v. Kotz. 758 P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1988) 
where four hours into deliberations the jury informed the court that it was unable 
to deliver a verdict. The court and counsel conferred and the judge informed the 
parties that he would orally give the jury a verdict-urging instruction which he 
later did. Kotz1 counsel, though expressing reservations about the instruction, 
did not raise an objection to it or move for a mis-trial. Counsel also did not 
object to the oral instruction even though the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
require written copies be provided to counsel. After further deliberation the jury 
convicted Kotz. Id, 463-464. 
Three weeks later Kotz moved the Court for a new trial. The motion was 
denied and Kotz appealed claiming the verdict-urging instruction was coercive 
and as such reversible error. Id. 
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal without reaching the merits of 
Kotz1 claim. It held that Kotz had waived the requirement that a written copy of 
the instruction be provided to him and had failed to object to the instruction. In 
doing so the Court stated: 
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"To merely indicate that the instruction was not 'appropriate1 or to 
express 'concern1 does not constitute a viable objection upon which the court can 
rule. Additionally, counsel must also be able to articulate a reasonable basis for 
any objection." 
Id, 464-466. 
II. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUROR BROWN IN DENYING LUCERO'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
In support of his Motion for a New Trial Lucero submitted an affidavit of 
a juror which contained information about the jury1 s deliberative process. The 
trial judge refused to consider the affidavit ruling that Utah Rule of Evidence 
606(b) prohibited it. 
Utah case law is clear that a juror cannot disclose matters occurring 
during the course of a jury's deliberations. State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243 
(Utah 1992); State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988); Belden v. Dalbo. Inc.. 
752 P.2d 1317 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Russell. 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987). 
Lucero attempts to escape this prohibition by characterizing the 
supplemental instruction as extraneous prejudicial information and, thus, 
exempted from the prohibition of 606(b). This characterization should not be 
adopted by this Court. Adoption could allow trial litigants to delve into the 
effect of each jury instruction on the deliberative process of the jury by simply 
alleging the instruction was improper in some manner. Also, the status of the 
law in Utah already provides a framework for analyzing whether jury 
instructions are correct. 
State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) provides some instruction in 
this area. There two jurors failed to disclose during voir dire that they had had 
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experiences with crimes similar to those charged. In reviewing the defendant's 
conviction the Supreme Court stated: 
"Part of the guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury verdict to 
be based on evidence that has been subject to the procedural 
safeguards of a fair trial. See Turner v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 466 
(1965). To that effect, rule 606(b) is designed to permit juror 
testimony about extraneous matters and outside influences which 
may have come to bear on the jury verdict. At the same time, 
however, it has been our policy to limit narrowly the grounds for 
impeaching a jury verdict. See State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81, 83-
34 (Utah 1988). As the trial judge properly recognized in this 
case, information admitted and considered must be limited strictly 
to evidence that is covered by the exception in rule 606(b)." 
Evidence that the undisclosed information was used during 
deliberations should be admissible under the provision of rule 
606(b) allowing testimony on the question "whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Utah R. 
Evid. 606(b). As the United States Supreme Court observed in 
Mattox v. United States. 146 U.S. 140 (1892), "[A] juryman may 
testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of 
any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence 
operated upon his mind." Id. at 149 (citing Woodward v. Leavitt. 
107 Mass. 453 (1871)). In keeping with this rule, I would allow 
the trial judge to admit evidence regarding the jury's improper 
discussion and use of the information withheld on voir dire. I 
would not permit the judge, however, to inquire into the impact of 
those words on the jurors' mental processes. 
Id, 248-249. 
Thus, even if Lucero's characterization is adopted juror Brown's affidavit 
is admissible only for a limited purpose. It can be used to show that the jury 
was exposed to the supplemental instruction. But it cannot be used to show the 
effect of the instruction on the jury's deliberations. 
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Lucero1 s attempt to use the affidavit to support a claim that the jury was 
confused when deliberating should be rejected. 
in . THE INSTRUCTIONS, INCLUDING THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
INSTRUCTION, ADEQUATELY AND PROPERLY INFORMED THE 
JURY OF THE ELEMENTS OF POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON 
WITH INTENT TO ASSAULT. 
During its deliberations the jury sent a question to the trial judge: "Is 
intent against the law?" The judge's written response was: "It is illegal to 
possess a deadly weapon with intent to assault. Intent without a deadly weapon 
is not illegal." Lucero contends the second sentence of the response changed the 
juryfs verdict from not guilty to guilty. 
The State argues that Lucero's focus on that second sentence alone is too 
narrow. Whether the response is improper should be determined by looking at it 
along with all of the other jury instructions and in the context of the case. 
Jury instructions must accurately and adequately inform a criminal jury as 
to the basic elements of the crime charged. State v. Roberts. 711 P.2d 235 
(Utah 1985); State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 23 (Utah 1980). In evaluating whether a 
jury has been adequately informed, one must look at the instructions as a whole. 
State v. Pascual. 804 P.2d 553 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Bingham. 684 P.2d 
43 (Utah 1984); State v. Lawson. 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks. 
638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). "[T]he law in Utah is that jury instructions are to be 
considered as a whole. . . (citations omitted). When taken as a whole if they 
fairly tender the case to the jury, the fact that one or more of the instructions, 
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have been is not 
reversible error." State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981). 
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Applying these rules to the instructions in this case, the jury was properly 
informed as to all of the elements the State needed to prove before Lucero could 
be found guilty. Instruction number 15 stated: 
To convict the defendant, Robert Lucero, of possession of a deadly 
weapon with intent to assault, each of the following elements must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 
One: That on or about July 14, 1992; 
Two: In Salt Lake County, Utah; 
Three: The defendant, Robert A. Lucero; 
Four: Did have upon his person a dangerous weapon with 
intent to unlawfully assault another. 
If you find from the evidence that the elements have been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to return a verdict 
of guilty; however, if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or 
more of the elements, it is your duty to return a verdict of not 
guilty. 
Transcript, 152-153. Definitions of "intent," "dangerous weapon," and 
"assault" were also give to the jury. Transcript 151-154. The State prosecutor 
reviewed those elements in his opening argument and stated that it was necessary 
for the State to prove each of them before a verdict of guilty could be made. 
Transcript, 43. The prosecutor also went over them very specifically in closing 
argument again making it clear that all of them needed to be established. 
Transcript, 156-157. 
The legal standard has been met even if one considers the judge fs two 
sentence response by itself. The response to the juryfs question was: "It is 
illegal to possess a deadly weapon with intent to assault. Intent without a deadly 
weapon is not illegal." That first sentence contains all of the elements of the 
crime and it was reasonable for the judge to believe that the jury would 
understand and read the second sentence in conjunction with the first. 
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Also, at trial Lucerofs defense was that he never intended to assault the 
victim. He admitted to possessing the weapon, transcript 162-168. However, in 
his brief he argues that the jury could have been asking about intent to possess 
the weapon and that the judge's response allowed them to forget about the 
element of intent to assault. However, given the entirety of the jury instructions, 
the discussion of the element of intent to assault in opening and closing argument 
by the prosecutor, and Lucero's defense that while he possessed the weapon he 
did not intend to assault the victim, it is clear that the jury knew the element had 
to be established before he could be convicted. 
IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
COMMUNICATING THE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION TO THE 
JURY WITHOUT CONSULTING THE PARTIES. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m) reads as follows: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform 
the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request 
to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be brought 
before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both 
counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury 
that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in 
writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which 
case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the 
record. 
A close reading of this rule makes it clear that the trial judge has two 
options upon learning that the jury, during deliberations, wishes to ask the judge 
a question. The judge may bring the jury into the courtroom and, in the 
presence of the parties, respond to the question. The judge, however, may 
choose to not take the jury away from its deliberations and instead respond to a 
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question in writing, and if the judge does so the question and response must be 
entered into the record. The rule does not say that counsel are entitled to have 
prior input into the judgefs response. 
The rule allows the judge the discretion to limit the parties' input to 
lodging objections to the response after it has been put into the record. 
If this Court concludes the trial judge committed error in communicating 
with the jury without consulting the parties, that error should be considered 
harmless because, as outlined in Argument III above, the communication itself 
was, in the context of the case and the other jury instructions, an accurate 
reflection of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing this Court should deny Lucerofs appeal and 
affirm the conviction. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 199, 
Nolan 
Dep. Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for State of Utah 
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